

FINAL REPORT

of the

COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY

On The Events And Occurrences At The Diliman Campus From

February 1 to 9, 1971

University of the Philippines

Submitted on April 12, 1971

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University of the Philippines

COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY

On the Incidents and Occurrences on the Diliman Campus from
February 1 to 9, 1971

March 17, 1971

Dr. Salvador P. Lopez
President
University of the Philippines

S i r :

We, the members of the Committee of Inquiry, designated by you on February 22, 1971 to make a comprehensive report of occurrences at the University from February 1 to 9, 1971, and recommend guidelines on the basis of its findings, transmit herewith our Report.

It was made clear from the beginning that this Committee was not an investigating committee but one which would determine the facts in respect of said occurrences and events and make its recommendations on the basis of such fact-finding. From available records and persons who have been willing to share with us their experiences of this period of the University's travail, the Committee endeavored to collect and draw out the facts necessary for its Report to be as accurate and comprehensive as possible. The spirit and process of free inquiry followed by the Committee likewise provided ample opportunity to all participants in this fact-finding for voluntary expression and perception, which greatly enhanced the Committee's forming a thorough and broad understanding of what happened. Therefore, your Committee did not consider within its terms of reference the taking of testimonies under oath under the legal procedures that usually characterize a formal investigation. On the basis of its findings, a regular investigating group could then be constituted depending on the desire of the University Administration.

The Committee, aside from meeting in plenary to receive testimonies, also divided themselves into sub-groups in order to apportion the work. A total of 78 individuals were interviewed consisting of officials of the Administration, students, residents, administrative personnel, campus security personnel, faculty members as well as the Quezon City Police, Metrocom, officials of Malacañang and Congress. The Committee regrets that it was unable to interview Mr. Baculinao and certain members of the Student Council despite several invitations.

In its method of work, the Committee also took to the field and made ocular inspections of buildings, offices and properties especially

for signs of forcible entry and loss of property. A list of documents consulted by the Committee is included in the appendices.

However, by virtue of the nature and composition of the Committee, which is a fact-finding body and not an investigatory group, the Committee was unable to reconstruct the necessary events and findings on the basis of which charges could be brought and disciplinary action meted out against individuals. In addition, the Quezon City Police Department as well as other groups, such as the Alumni Association, are conducting legal investigations for court action. As a matter of fact, certain individuals the Committee wished to interview declined to appear before the Committee for fear of jeopardizing their rights in the investigations now in progress at the Quezon City Fiscal's office.

All members of the Committee have worked hard on the Report, and it is the best that could be produced within a limited time. The Committee wishes to record herewith its appreciation for the opportunity given it to be of special service to the University.

Respectfully yours,

(Sgd.) Carlos P. Ramos
Chairman

(Sgd.) Mercedes B. Concepcion

(Sgd.) Alfredo V. Lagmay

(Sgd.) Oseas A. del Rosario

(Sgd.) Bienvenido T. Miranda

(Sgd.) Florentino Herrera, Jr.

(Sgd.) Alfredo T. Morales

(Sgd.) Dominador I. Ilio

(Sgd.) Cristina P. Parel

(Sgd.) Oscar L. Evangelista
Secretary

PART I. NARRATION OF FACTS

Monday, February 1.

1. On Monday the morning newspapers announced the resumption of the jeepney strike and reported that the students were supporting the strike as they did in the previous month of January.
2. At the Arts and Science Building, students were urged through loudspeakers to boycott their classes and join the barricades. Groups of activists made rounds of classes then being held, interrupting proceedings in the classrooms. It is to be noted in this connection that the loudspeakers being utilized belong to the Physical Plant Office and installed for the students on their request.
3. The Office of the President of the University was aware that groups of UP students had been preparing the previous Friday and Saturday for student action in support of the jeepney strike. At 9:00 a.m. this Monday, students were observed moving towards the direction of the approaches to the University, some carting or carrying materials presumably to be set up as barricades.
4. Information was received about students stopping vehicles and pedestrians along University Avenue. President Lopez summoned Colonel Oscar Alvarez, Chief of the UP Security Division, instructing him to proceed to University Avenue to determine what the situation was.
5. Meanwhile, a number of telephone calls were received at the Office of the President complaining of inconveniences due to the stoppage of vehicular traffic along the barricades. An irate faculty member sought the President, strongly protesting that she had been forced to leave her taxicab. Though she identified herself as a member of the faculty, she was made to walk to her classes. This was only one of several similar instances affecting University personnel and residents.
6. Chief Alvarez returned from the barricades, reporting that everything was in order. The President told him, however, that he had just received many complaints of inconveniences at the barricades. Chief Alvarez was directed to return immediately to help ensure that faculty members and employees of the University were allowed through the barricades.
7. Alvarez and his uniformed men detailed in that area, announced to the students the President's directive and attempted to remove the barricades. A skirmish developed, during which pillbox bombs and gasoline bombs were thrown at the UP security guards. One guard drew his side-arm and fired warning shots. The students retaliated with bombs resulting in the injury to five security guards. More students arrived and reinforced the barricades. Their number was variously estimated at two to three hundred. The students' hostility toward the

security guards intensified and some were heard blaming the President for the acts of the guards.

8. At the rear entrance of the University, (Lopez Jaena St. corner Katipunan) a group of students stationed themselves across the entrance. As in the front entrance, students were soliciting financial contributions, allegedly for the jeepney drivers.

9. Shortly before noon, Professor Inocentes Campos, of the Mathematics Department, was driving his car towards U.P., having previously ascertained by phone from the University Secretary, that there was no order suspending classes. Upon recognizing the professor, students on University Avenue tossed pillbox bombs at his car. The left rear tire exploded, forcing the car to a stop. Professor Campos alighted, amidst exploding bombs and fired his guns several times. A student of the College of Arts and Sciences, Pastor Mesina, Jr., was wounded and taken by car to the UP Infirmary. (Mesina died three days later at the Veterans Memorial Hospital.)

10. The shooting by Professor Campos lasted some four to five minutes. During this time, at least three of the UP security guards were at the scene. They arrested the Professor and brought him to the Quezon City Police Department. Following this incident, the students became exceedingly hostile and blamed President Lopez for not having Professor Campos disarmed and for ordering the security guards to remove the barricades. The students, including Mr. Baculinao, then marched towards Quezon Hall.

11. Upon hearing the tumult outside the door of his anteroom, President Lopez, accompanied by Dean Armando J. Malay, went out to meet with the students at the hallway.

12. The students crowded around the President, shouting, cursing, and blaming him for the shooting of Mesina. They also demanded to know why the President did not consult with them before he ordered the breaking of barricades. The students broke the wooden lattice-work, window panes, and oil portraits. One student tossed a piece of wood at the President, hitting him on the right chest.

13. Mr. Baculinao tried to protect the President telling his colleagues not to hurt him. Upon Mr. Baculinao's instructions, the crowd went down and left the building. The confrontation took about 30 minutes.

14. Meanwhile, students who were left at the barricades proceeded to burn the car of Professor Campos. The column of smoke was seen from afar, attracting the attention of the Quezon City police.

15. At the Quezon City Police Department, complaints were received on the disorder at the University. Colonel Tomas Karingal, Chief of

Police of Quezon City, dispatched detectives to investigate. Approaching the University at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the detectives were stopped by the students at the barricades. They returned to their Headquarters and reported that they were stopped by the students to Chief Karingal and Mayor Amoranto.

16. Meanwhile, President Lopez received a call from Camp Aguinaldo, inviting him to a meeting of the Peace and Order Council, under the chairmanship of Secretary Vicente Abad Santos of the Department of Justice. Among those present were Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor, Secretary of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile, Colonel Tomas Karingal, and General Eduardo Garcia of the Philippine Constabulary. The Council was convened to consider the peace and order situation in the country, and President Lopez was invited to provide information on the UP situation.

17. Because of the shooting incident, the burning of Professor Campos' car, and the students' blocking of traffic, the Council considered forced entry of the police into the U.P. campus. President Lopez protested, invoking an agreement between him and Mayor Amoranto that the police would enter the campus only when requested by the President of the University. It was pointed out to President Lopez that such agreement was not valid and that the laws should take precedence over it.

18. President Lopez cited the special and unique role of the University as an academic institution and called attention to precedents among universities abroad whereby the police are inhibited, by principle and tradition, from entering the premises of academic institutions as violative of the norms and values of institutions of higher learning. A general consensus, from which President Lopez dissociated himself on the ground that it would cause more bloodshed and destruction, was nevertheless reached that the Quezon City Police should enter the University and clear the national roads. Failing in this, the QCPD would be placed under Philippine Constabulary control. From this meeting, President Lopez and the others, proceeded to Quezon City Hall. In the meantime the Police had deployed along the approaches to the University. The students had advanced the barricades to the west boundary of the campus, setting up obstructions not only on University Avenue but also on Commonwealth Avenue.

19. At Mayor Amoranto's Office, President Lopez again appealed to the Mayor to stop his police forces from entering the University. Colonel Karingal, impatient to execute orders given to him, refused to delay further stating that a decision had been reached at Camp Aguinaldo and he had a duty to remove the barricades. He then directed his deputy to enter the campus, in response to a call from the police at the barricades.

20. Violence followed the police action. In the skirmish, 18 students

were arrested, whereupon Mr. Baculinao went to the Mayor's Office finding President Lopez and party already there.

21. Mayor Amoranto took the position that he had to order his men to remove the barricades at the University because he did not want to provide a reason for the P.C. to place Quezon City under its control as he had been warned at the Camp Aguinaldo meeting.

22. After removing the barricades the police forces advanced up to the area fronting Quezon Hall, then withdrew.

23. Sometime in the late afternoon, the Cafeteria kitchen at Vinzons Hall was forcibly entered, through the dining hall. Vats of food were taken. Later, the vats were left under the care of the PNB security guard.

Tuesday, February 2,

24. Early in the morning barricades were back at the University Avenue. A big student group was seen carting tree trunks, rocks, and other materials towards University Avenue. By 9:00 a.m. the barricades had been reinforced, and were manned by students.

25. A walkie-talkie transceiver, on trial loan to the U.P. Security Division, was issued to the students, to enable coordination between the activists and the security guard. The transceiver has disappeared.

26. In the meantime, faculty members and residents of the University campus had gathered at the University Theatre. They marched to Quezon Hall and met with President Lopez at the Operations Center. Complaints of serious inconveniences resulting from the barricades were aired, and relief action was demanded. At this time a column of students, some of them carrying logs was seen headed towards Quezon Hall. The meeting was ended when the faculty members and residents suggested that they go down and talk with the students. Despite efforts of Dean Malay to invite some student leaders, this proposed dialogue did not take place.

27. At about 11:00 a.m. a motorized column was seen on University Avenue, consisting of buggies fully equipped and manned by policemen with gas masks, reinforced by Metrocom troopers, also with gas masks. At the rear entrance of the Campus a contingent of police was also observed.

28. Tear gas bombs were thrown at the barricades. The barricaders fell back, and took a second position in front of Quezon Hall.

29. At the rear entrance, the police did not remove the barricade. A force of Metrocom troopers took a position apparently to protect the Balara filter area.

30. In view of these developments, a group of faculty members were

deputized to negotiate with Colonel Karingal and his forces. They crossed "no-man's land", met with Colonel Karingal in the vicinity of the old checkpoint and appealed to him to withdraw his men and give the University authorities time to solve the barricade problem. But Colonel Karingal replied that he had orders to move in unless the barricades were removed and gave the students half an hour to do so.

31. When his ultimatum became known, President Lopez's intercession was sought. The President, and some members of his staff pleaded with Colonel Karingal for time to solve the problem, but Colonel Karingal remained unmoved. He said that he had orders to clear the road. He, however, assured President Lopez that he would not enter the buildings. In the meantime, the countdown had begun. When only three minutes remained, the President and his group withdrew towards Quezon Hall. At the appointed time, the police supported by the Metrocom moved in, using tear gas and cleared the roads.

32. Students scampered toward Abelardo Hall, the Physical Plant Office building, and the Faculty Center. The Metrocom troopers chased them as far as the amphitheater, and then withdrew.

33. One group of police forces penetrated up to the vicinity of the Faculty Center while another proceeded towards the Physical Plant and Area 14. Having removed the barricades, police forces also withdrew.

34. Scattered incidents occurred within the University campus at this time. At about 3:00 p.m., Undersecretary of Defense, Jose Crisol, came to the University, apparently to size up the situation. During his conversation with President Lopez at the ground floor of the Administration Building, Undersecretary Crisol informed the President that several outsiders had joined the students and that a Pepsi-Cola truck loaded with bottles of gasoline had entered the University campus. He tended to minimize the seriousness of the situation, referring to it as a "comedy". President Lopez, however, disagreed saying that it was wrong to take the situation lightly, but was assured that the police would not enter the University buildings.

35. At about this time students manning the barricade at the intersection of Osmeña and Roces Avenues hurled pillbox bombs at a white jeep moving eastward along Osmeña Avenue. The jeep, belonging to the U.P. Security Division, Plate No. RP 20-6, stopped; men in civilian clothes alighted, pursued the students who had retreated northward on Roces Avenue and fired guns in their direction.

36. In the meantime, President Lopez, accompanied by some members of his staff, went back to Quezon City Hall to plead anew with Mayor Amoranto about keeping the police out of the campus. However, the Mayor insisted on waiting for Colonel Karingal who was then at Malacanang. Colonel Karingal did not return so nothing definite resulted although the U.P. group stayed till 7:00 p.m.

37. At about 3:30 p.m., the contingent of police and Metrocom stationed at the rear campus entrance to maintain a free flow of traffic along Katipunan Avenue, were taunted and jeered by students at Vinzons Hall. Molotov cocktails and pillbox bombs were thrown at the police. After removing the barricades, the police pursued the students. The latter retreated in the direction of the Education, Business and Arts and Science buildings.

38. At about 4:00 p.m., a student was apprehended by the police at Jacy's Restaurant, and was mauled as he was boarding the jeep.

39. In the afternoon, the students intensified their activities, consolidating their ranks and erecting more and stronger barricades all over the campus, but mainly in the area of the College of Arts and Sciences. Late in the afternoon, the barricade in front of the east wing of Sampaguita Residence Hall was set on fire. Shortly thereafter, the military came from two directions, Vinzons Hall and Area 14, removing barricades in their way. They took up positions in the front and sides of Kamia and Sampaguita. Residents and non-residents sought refuge in these dormitories. Gunshots were heard, and simultaneously tear gas was felt. The police ordered the refugees to come out, giving assurance that the girls would not be harmed. The east and west doors of Sampaguita were forced open. At least five uniformed men wearing gas masks and white helmets were seen on corridor A of Sampaguita and at least two others on corridor B on the second floor. On corridor D of the first floor, two khaki-uniformed men were also seen. They wore no gas masks and no nameplates but had white helmets on.

40. The incident resulted in at least one student casualty, Reynaldo Bello, a student of the College of Veterinary Medicine, was wounded in the arm, behind Pavilion 2. He managed to walk to Roxas Avenue, after being hit, from where friends took him to the Infirmary. He was later transferred to the Veterans Memorial Hospital, then to the Philippine General Hospital. At the Philippine General Hospital, a 38 caliber bullet was extracted from Mr. Bello's arm.

41. During this action some fifty students were brought to Police Headquarters. By 8:30 p.m. the last military vehicles had departed, and the girls went back to their respective residence halls, only to leave again because of the gas. Some discovered the loss of cash and valuables. Later, the girls organized a protest march.

42. The action left marks on windows, doors, furniture and walls that could have been caused by bullet slugs and tear gas canisters.

43. Students occupied Palma Hall and forcibly entered the DZUP and took over the management and broadcasting activity of the station. By nightfall, the occupants had increased and declared the building,

"liberated."

44. The storerooms, preparation rooms and several laboratories of the Chemistry Department were forced open; chemicals and glassware were taken out. Curtains in the DZUP and Herrera Memorial Hall (Room 1100) were torn down and hauled away.

45. They also occupied the roof of the Engineering Building, took possession of the transmission facilities of DZUP, and broadcast their own programs. To secure their position, the students placed barbed wire obstacles along the stairs leading to the roof deck. The iron-grill gates in front of the building were also secured with wire.

Wednesday, February 3.

46. That morning, there was quiet on the campus; there was hardly a car on the roads, and few people were on the streets. More barricades had been added. Red flags were hoisted on top of Palma and Melchor Halls, and several students were on the roof. The Philippine flag atop Quezon Hall had its red side up. Now and then, however, an explosion would be heard; or the whirr of a helicopter overhead would be punctuated by the detonation of a kwitits.

47. President Lopez called an assembly of the community, scheduled for 11:00 o'clock on the front steps of Palma Hall. The President, Dean Cesar Majul and Dean Malay rode in a Radio Patrol car and announced the meeting in the residential areas. About a thousand people attended. The President spoke on two issues, namely, the "militarization" of the University, and the "proposed closure" of the University. To demonstrate opposition to these threats, the assembly agreed by acclamation to maintain the barricades, and to march to Congress the next day. At about this time, a helicopter was flying over the campus. Before the President's speech was over, student lookouts on top of Palma Hall shouted that the military was re-entering the campus.

48. Elements of the police were seen along Osmeña Avenue in front of Abelardo and Villamor Halls. Commotion followed: student leaders exhorted students to man the barricades. Classroom chairs were thrown from the second floor of the building to strengthen the barricades. A group of administration officials moved towards Melchor Hall where the head of the police column had paused and requested Major Clemente to withdraw his men. After sometime, the police acceded, on the condition that faculty members be stationed at the main entrance to the University and direct vehicles to Commonwealth Avenue. The police withdrew at about 1:00.

49. While some students were eating lunch at about 2:00 p.m., three Quezon City policemen penetrated the east end of Quirino Avenue (south of the Narra Residence Hall). The students cursed and taunted

them. This was followed by sporadic gunfire and bomb explosions all around. The Police tried to break the locked door of the Narra Residence Hall on Quirino Avenue, but they were persuaded to desist and come to the unlocked rear door instead. They did so, with drawn guns, but they were talked out of entering the dormitory.

50. Later in the afternoon, more policemen in several jeeps and 6 x 6 trucks were on Katipunan Road, in front of the U.P. High School.

51. In response to appeals via Radyo Patrol and solicitation by students, food and cash donations started coming in. These were received at the Kamia Residence Hall which had been designated as the food center. Besides food, students prepared Molotov cocktails and pillbox bombs on the yard of Kamia and Sampaguita Halls.

52. At about 4:00 o'clock, skirmishes between the police and barricaders occurred in the vicinity of Vinzons Hall. The police alternately penetrated and withdrew from Vinzons area three times.

53. At about this time Senators Kalaw, Salonga, Benitez, Aquino, Tamano, Magsaysay, Laurel, Lagumbay and Tañada came to the campus, and met with the President. During this meeting, explosions were heard from the direction of the U.P. Library and Arts and Science Buildings. What they observed from Quezon Hall prompted one group of the senators to go to the Vinzons area while another group decided to proceed to Malacanang to request President Marcos to order the police to withdraw from the campus. At the same time, President Lopez, in a telephone conversation with President Marcos, strongly urged the latter to remove the troops so that the community can solve the problem of the barricades. President Marcos agreed on condition that President Lopez assume responsibility for the situation.

54. Later in the afternoon President Lopez received information that President Marcos had ordered the withdrawal of the police and Metrocom from the Diliman area.

55. Other events that transpired this day were: (1) strengthening of various barricades; (2) continuation of broadcast over DZUP; (3) virtual takeover of Palma and Melchor Halls; and (4) breaking into of the south side door of U.P. Library and the students finding their way to the roof, where they posted lookouts. The same afternoon President Lopez and Dean Majul were invited by some faculty members to represent the Administration in a "Provisional Revolutionary Committee." In Addition to the Administration, this committee was to be composed of a faculty representative, two student representatives, and a representative each from Area 11 and Barrio Kruz na Ligas. President Lopez rejected the whole idea, and it did not materialize.

56. At about 9:30 p.m., a motorcycle with side car was forcibly taken

from an Inspector of the Enriquez Security and Investigation Agency. The motorcycle, minus the sidecar and some parts, was in the corridor of the International Center on March 19, 1971.)

57. An army truck with a trailer was bombed. The trailer was abandoned. (The Army later claimed and repossessed the trailer.)

Thursday, February 4.

58. The projected march to Congress was called off. Nevertheless, many faculty members and employees who had come for the rally milled around the lobby of Quezon Hall.

59. At about 9:00 a.m., a JD service vehicle, body # 6, of unknown plate number, was forcibly taken from its driver, Rolando Oliva, on Katipunan Road near the Narra Dining Hall, by unknown students. The service car was subsequently burned with molotov cocktails and pill-box bombs.

60. Half an hour later, the Police came in from Katipunan Road, followed by sporadic gunfire and bomb explosions on Quirino Avenue and Shuster Street. The Students retaliated with bombs and kwitis, some of them coming from the roof of the Narra Residence Hall.

61. President Lopez called up President Marcos to obtain assurance that the troops would not return even if the barricades had not been removed. More time was needed to persuade the students.

62. The scheduled Executive Committee meeting was postponed indefinitely. The proposed agenda included the revision of the academic calendar.

63. A Community Working Committee to establish rapport with the students was organized. Named to the Committee were Dean Malay, Chairman; Dean Majul, Dean Escudero, Professor Zeus Salazar, Professor Roger Posadas, Mr. Tenario Rivera, Reverend Ungson, Reverend Mequi, Professor Virginia Agbayani, Mr. Faulan, and Mr. Cuevo, members. A counterpart number of students to be named by Mr. Baculinao was to complete the membership of the Committee. He promised to give the names of the student members.

64. In the afternoon, the students opened the main door of the U.P. Press and occupied the premises. They printed "Bandilang Pula," with the help of University Press technicians who were provided by the administration to save the equipment from inexperienced hands.

65. Pastor Mesina, the student who was hit by gunfire on February 1st, died at 6:15 p.m. at the Veterans Memorial Hospital.

66. In the evening "new" faces were seen in the campus, some of them

manning the barricades. A motorcycle was commandeered about this time. The "Provisional Directorate" of the "Diliman Commune" was announced.

Friday, February 5.

67. Very few students were left in the dormitories as many of them had been fetched by their parents or relatives. On account of the tense atmosphere, some faculty members and employees in the University compound had "evacuated" their families. Many students and faculty members did not know whether or not classes would be resumed and many came to see for themselves the conditions in the University.

68. The Board of Regents, aware of the problem, held an emergency meeting in the morning mainly to decide on what to do with the second semester "to save the academic standing of the students without sacrificing standards". The Board took the position that the University should remain open for the rest of the second semester, agreed to maintain the revised university calendar, and authorized President Lopez, in consultation with heads of academic units, to make necessary arrangements for classes to satisfy minimum requirements. In the same meeting, President Lopez and Ericson Baculinao briefed the other members of the Board on the situation in the University. It was agreed that a dialogue be arranged with representatives of different sectors of the University Community - the administrative staff, the faculty, students, residents and alumni "to assess the situation and adopt long-range policy for the promotion and maintenance of academic life".

69. Mr. Baculinao agreed to the internal transport arrangements as proposed by the Community Working Committee. These concerned the shuttle bus service between the Esso Service Center and the different areas of the campus.

70. A meeting of the Community Working Committee scheduled for the afternoon did not take place because there were no student representatives. Reports of looting and strange faces manning the barricades and roaming the streets at night alarmed many of the university residents. Fear for the safety of their families and homes brought the residents together (especially those in Area 2) to plan for security.

71. Following the take-over of the U.P. Press the day before, the maiden issue of "Bandilang Pula" came out - the "first publication" of the Provisional Directorate. Its editorial staff used the names Graciano Lopez Jaena, Marcelo H. del Pilar, Emilio Jacinto, Apolinario Mabini and Karl Marx.

72. New names were painted on some of the buildings by persons unknown. Quezon Hall was renamed "Kom. Dante Hall"; Faculty Center, "Jose Ma. Sison Center"; the Library, "Amado Guerrero Hall"; Abelardo

73. "Tanghalang Bayan". Revolutionary slogans were painted on the walls of Palma and Melchor Halls.

74. An Esso security guard, Ruben Valeros, was found in the Children's Playground, at about 8:00 p.m., with stab wounds. The infirmary ambulance took him to Veterans Memorial Hospital, then to Orthopedic Hospital. His personal effects were taken back by the ambulance driver to the Infirmary. (Valeros died at 3:30 a.m., February 6, 1971.)

75. Some alumni sent donations in cash and kind to Quezon Hall.

Saturday, February 6.

76. Early in the morning (1:30 a.m.) two taxicabs were commandeered. A Sta. Teresita taxi with plate number TX 27-04 '70 was forcibly taken from its driver, Teofilo Soria, on University Avenue. The driver was told to "leave the taxicab or be harmed" and was promised its return "at the termination of the strike." The second incident involved a Le Saint Taxi, with plate number TX 27-43 '70, which was forcibly taken from its driver, Randy Diesta, by unknown demonstrators at the junction of Commonwealth and University Avenues. The driver was injured with molotov bombs and treated for first and second degree burns at the Veterans Memorial Hospital. The taxicab was subsequently burned.

77. At about 6:30 a.m., tension erupted anew at Katipunan Road near the entrance to the Balara Filter area and the Narra Residence Hall. The police cleared the barricades at Katipunan Road on orders of Mayor Amoranto. This became the occasion of exchange of gunfire and bombs. A student, Danilo Delfin, crossed Shuster Street from the Narra Residence Hall side to the Vinzons Hall side, about fifty meters from the Katipunan Wall. He was felled by a 33 caliber bullet when he was two-thirds of the way across. His friends, whom he was trying to join on the Vinzons Hall side, pulled him to safety. Some medical student first aiders came to Mr. Delfin's aid and took him to the infirmary a few minutes after he was hit. He was later transferred to the Veterans Memorial Hospital, where he was operated on. (Mr. Delfin is presently undergoing physiotherapy. The bullet slug entered Mr. Delfin's left shoulder, traveled downward diagonally and was lodged near the waist. It damaged his lungs and spinal cord, and paralyzed his body below the waist.)

78. At 10:00 a.m., some area residents and students began arriving at the steps of Quezon Hall to attend a meeting called and organized by some residents of Area 2, led by Jose Diaz. What started out as the airing of gripes against the barricades and those who came to defend their side upon learning that a community meeting was going on. The President had earlier been asked to speak on administration plans but even his explanation that steps were being taken to normalize the situation did not satisfy the group. There were cries of protest when Dean Malay announced the names of some members of the Community Working

Committee who were not residents. To satisfy one and all, Dean Malay agreed that area representatives named by residents of the respective areas would form part of the Working Committee.

78. There was a general feeling that since the UP Security Division had been immobilized to prevent possible shootouts with the students, the community, particularly the residential areas, was vulnerable to undesirable elements and "unfamiliar faces" in the campus who might take advantage of the situation and victimize the residents. The Bonda (community patrol) System was adopted by area residents. It served as a morale booster for those who chose to stay despite reports that many residents had evacuated their families. Male residents took turns in patrolling the areas from 9:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m.

79. The shuttle bus service, which had been planned by the Community Working Committee, started operating in the afternoon providing transportation on University Avenue and from Quezon Hall to the various residential areas on the campus.

Sunday, February 7.

80. Sunday was quiet and uneventful. The big P.E. bus shuttled back and forth every fifteen minutes carrying passengers between the Esso Service Center and Quezon Hall. From Quezon Hall, two service trucks ferried the passengers to the residential areas. Although the transport system seemed to have soothed the ruffled feelings of campus residents who did not have private transportation, the system seemed insufficient to dispel the impression that the activists were in control of the University. The commandeered taxis were roaming around the campus filled with people who were allegedly enjoying the ride. Some men were seen walking with molotov bombs in their hands. Capping the impression of activist takeover was the reported news that the students would present seven demands to the U.P. administration and President Marcos before the barricades would be lifted. The demands were the (1) rollback of prices of oil to the pre-strike level as of January 6th; (2) dropping of all criminal charges against the students; (3) banning the entry of all military personnel on campus; (4) dismissal from the University of Prof. Inocentes Campos; (5) control of DZUP by the "Provisional Directorate of the Diliman Commune", and the removal of the U.S.I.S. materials from the radio station; (6) free use of the U.P. Press; and (7) investigation of the U.P. Security Police and the removal of Col. Oscar Alvarez from the said agency. Although it was reported later that there were fewer students manning the barricades and that the number of outsiders was growing, the impression of student domination did not change. (According to Dean Majul, the number of students sleeping at the College of Arts and Sciences dropped from about 300 on Wednesday night to about 35 by Sunday night.)

81. Some more taxicabs were reported commandeered on this day. A Mercury taxicab, plate number TX 70-14 '70, was forcibly taken from its

driver, Francisco Cadampoo, at about 3:30 a.m., on Katipunan Road near Area 5. The taxicab was burned later that morning. At about 5:00 a.m., a Rixal taxicab, plate number TX 13-91 '70, was forcibly taken from its driver, Rodolfo Oxciano, in the "U.P. Compound". The driver's money was also reportedly taken.

82. The Working Committee circulated its first bulletin announcing, among others, the resumption of classes on Monday, and the schedule of shuttle bus service.

83. Some residents including the President, were invited to a meeting at DZUP that evening. This meeting was broadcast over that station.

Monday, February 8.

84. At about 3:30 a.m., an explosion occurred near Sampaguita Residence Hall. This was followed by the burning of several drums of gasoline belonging to the Weather Bureau.

85. A few regular classes met. At the University Avenue entrance, protest classes were held. A group of students headed by Ramon Puno installed a public address system at Quezon Hall and started to explain their stand concerning the barricades. An altercation between this group and those manning the barricades followed.

86. One of the two walls at the main entry of Plaridel Hall outside the lobby was defaced presumably during the previous afternoon or evening. The words "Amado Hernandez Hall" and "KM" (plus its emblem) were painted in red. The bronze dedication plaque was also "repainted."

87. The College of Pharmacy Dean found his office in disarray. Office equipment and personal effects were missing. (The equipment was later discovered in the Ladies Room.)

88. At Ilang-Ilang Residence Hall, a lecture and demonstration on practical self-defense was sponsored by the Vanguard Fraternity and the Rangerettes.

89. The President, accompanied by Dean Malay, called on Mayor Amoranto and Police Chief Karingal at the Mayor's Office at Quezon City Hall.

90. The Chief of Police was deeply concerned about the many crimes reportedly committed by the students in the campus. He was especially concerned about the commandeering of taxis, solicitation of funds without prior authority, and reports of looting and robbery. He also cited the discovery of a wounded Esso employee within the University grounds. He complained that barricades prevented the Quezon City police from looking into these matters, although the University campus is a part of Quezon City and under its jurisdiction.

81. The President pleaded for more time to persuade the students to lift the barricades. Colonel Karingal stated that he was waiting for warrants of arrest for Ericson Baculiniao and other student leaders. In his capacity as an officer of the court, he had authority and power to serve these warrants. He further emphasized that his forces would come in to enable these warrants to be served.

82. As he was leaving the Office of the Mayor, the President was advised for his own security, to spend the night outside the campus.

83. The firm position taken by Colonel Karingal on his duty to enter the campus weighed so heavily on President Lopez that he decided to ask the students to lift the barricades. In consultation with his Administrative Staff, he drafted a press statement early in the afternoon in the home of Dr. Oscar Alfonso at U.P. Village. He sent for Mr. Baculiniao and the latter came with Antonio Tagamolila. President Lopez read the text of the press release to them including his decision to resign if the barricades were not removed and the police forcibly entered the campus. Mr. Baculiniao and Mr. Tagamolila left to inform their companions. Later that afternoon, the press release was read over radio and TV, and circulated to the newspapers and elements of the U.P. community.

84. Another incident of taxicab commandeering was reported at 8:00 p.m. A Philippine taxicab, plate number TX 26-79 '70 was forcibly taken from its driver, Rodolfo Angeles, on University Avenue.

85. At about 9:30 that evening the DZUP sponsored a dialogue among elements of the community. The main subject was the removal of barricades and President Lopez' press release. Some student leaders argued for the continuance of the barricades, but some others who spoke were for their immediate removal. It was pointed out that the press release was an admission that the President could no longer hope to prevent the police from coming in and removing the barricades themselves. It was also pointed out that his resignation would be a severed blow to the students' struggle. The students eventually agreed to remove the barricades the following morning as they were then too tired and too few in number. The meeting ended at 11:00 p.m.

86. Professor Bienvenido T. Miranda and Director Manuel Dia relayed the information to President Lopez. The President telephoned DZUP and wanted to talk with Mr. Baculiniao, but the latter was unavailable according to Mr. Tirante, who answered the telephone. President Lopez proceeded to explain to Mr. Tirante why the barricades, at least those on the front and rear campus entrances, should be removed right away and not wait till morning. After the telephone call, he wrote a letter to Mr. Baculiniao. Essentially, the letter warned Mr. Baculiniao that there was considerable likelihood that the police would come into the campus to clear the roads at dawn. The President advised Mr. Baculiniao to immediately remove the barricades at the front and rear campus entrances

and thus forestall the entry of the police. Professor Miranda and Director Dia brought the letter to the barricade leader at the corner of Roces and Roxas Avenues. Mr. Baculinao had already left. The barricaders -- three boys and a girl -- were also urged to remove the barricade at the campus entrances immediately. The students expressed agreement and promised to remove the front barricade but not the rear one as it was too large for them to handle without adequate assistance.

Tuesday, February 9.

97. The barricades at the approaches to the University had been removed. The tension in the campus seemed to have lessened. Many students reported to their respective classrooms for the resumption of classes. In the College of Arts and Sciences, many of the chairs and other facilities were missing.

98. The students continued using the DZUP to broadcast their views. (The students turned over the radio station to a Faculty-Student Committee created by the Administration, on February 15, 1971. Likewise, the U.P. Press was "returned" to the University after the printing of the second issue of "Bandilang Pula" on February 11, 1971.)

99. A resolution was presented by some faculty members led by Dean Irene Cortes and Dr. Emerenciana Arcellana, stating their position against the barricades and the reasons supporting this stand. (This dialogue continued in a series of subsequent meetings held on February 10 and 11.)

100. In the meantime, clearing of campus roads was done by both the maintenance force of the University and the students. They brought back some of the chairs to the classrooms.

101. By the end of the day, life in the University was well on the way to normalcy. On President Lopez' invitation, Mayor Amoranto visited the University campus to see for himself the progress made towards returning normalcy at the University of the Philippines.

PART II. FINDINGS

From the facts gathered, the findings of the Committee are as follows:

1. The nine days of crisis in the University began on Monday, February 1st, on the issue of the students' sympathy with the jeepney drivers' strike. As the crisis progressed to the second day because of the intrusion of the police into the University, the defense of the University against a military invasion became an added issue. Following the withdrawal of the military on Wednesday, student power on the campus then assumed a highly political and ideological content in their attempt to establish the so-called "commune" and "Provisional Directorate" and in their views and opinions as expressed over the DCP and the UP Press, of which they took full possession, as well as through other forms of media.
2. The underlying policy of the University administration in handling the crisis centered upon the prevention of military confrontation with the students. All subsequent measures and steps taken by the President and the authorities of the administration in handling the crisis flowed from the basic policy. This policy was a reaffirmation of commitment made by President Marcos in early 1969 in a dialogue with the students at the Operations Center. He stated then that he would not allow the military to enter the University. Irrespective of the fact that it drew controversial and conflicting reactions, this policy received the endorsement generally of all sectors in the University. Much hope in its fullest possible success was cherished by people who were apprehensive that other possible alternatives of action in the crisis were fraught with terrible disaster and tragedy of enduring and far-ranging consequences to the University.
3. Upon the person of the President of the University fell the burden of the responsibilities and the pressures of the critical period from February 1 to 9. On him lay the main responsibility to maintain, as well as preserve the integrity and values of the University, as well as the initiative to make the most important decisions to overcome the crisis. On this he was alone. His decisions and actions were under scrutiny and subject to fiscalization on the part of the students, faculty and residents of the University, as well as the police force, the national authorities, the media, and the public at large. In his assumption of this inevitable role, the President was under heavy pressure from all sides representing a multiplicity of interests which frequently came into conflict with each other. The President's role as he saw it, was one of reconciling these conflicts, while at the same instance responding as best he could, under the circumstances, to the demands made of him. The President performed such role creditably.

6. The impact of the escalating crisis blurred the normal pattern of functions and responsibilities at the head office. Communication lines were shaken and administrative services were mainly interrupted. Oftentimes there was difficulty in responding to people who sought information on developments and guidance on what to do. It was simply difficult, at times impossible to "get in touch with the administration."

5. The Committee noted with appreciation, however, that most deans and directors and heads of offices in Diliman were at their respective posts during the period of stress. In many instances, unit leaders exercised their functions over and beyond the call of duty. However, the Committee also noted that in the main, leadership in the units appeared not to have been able to grasp the opportunity provided by the crisis to establish better contact with the students and to create a more active flow of information and inter-relationships between them for the purpose of helping to stabilize the situation. It is interesting to note that the machinery provided for this purpose, the Faculty-Student Committees never even functioned at a time they were most needed and on the occasion they could have proven their value.

4. The enforced interruption and disruption of classes and other University functions from February 1 to 9, 1971 was the culmination of a series of other interruptions during the earlier part of the academic year which, in varying degrees, were quite effective in creating widespread tension and anxiety for everyone in the community. There was an impression that during these occasions, the normal functions of the University were out of control and were in the hands of student groups who took initiative and made unilateral decisions on matters that affected all sectors of the constituency. These frequent disruptions of working schedules and standards could actually have had the effect of slowly undermining the structures of the academic processes, which, after some time, virtually would ensue into something akin to a state of anomie. In this state, people are confused as to what to expect. There is a pervasive ambiguity of the environment that is a source of unbearable frustration, futility, or danger to some individuals. Under these conditions, when the coping functions of the community or institution are weakened or emasculated, the introduction, even the imposition, of other structures by interested groups should not be too difficult. The sense of community of students, faculty, and residents was very seriously assaulted in the case under inquiry, which may be regarded as a sign of a basic weakness in its civic and social organization from the beginning.

3. The barricades and action therein resulted in several injuries on the students, security guards, and others. Barricades, especially at the outer approaches to the University invited police action leading to their forcible removal. They also served to provide the excuse for the military to enter the University. Moreover, the barricades provided the place, the occasion and the fuse for hostile confrontation with

Military forces and therefore to violence. Those established internally created serious insecurity on the part of the residents and others especially when manned by outsiders of questionable identity. The presence of Molotov cocktails, pillbox bombs, other explosives and their use created constant and continuing fear on the part of the residents. Needless to say, barricades are a hindrance to the free flow of traffic and the free movement of pedestrians and are thereby unlawful and punishable even during normal times.

9. Because of prevailing tension and persistent difficulties of various kinds, a number of residents evacuated their families from the campus. Student residents in the dormitories were evacuated by parents and relatives to such an extent as to leave from ten to fifteen per cent only of the original population of the girls' dormitories remaining at the height of the tension.

8. Especially during periods of emergency and catastrophes resulting from student action and from natural causes such as typhoons, community welfare and public interest dictates that basic services in the community should be made available to those victims that urgently need them. The evidence has shown, however, that these services were oftentimes hampered and in some instances prevented by action of the students. Medical personnel of the Infirmary were made to walk from the barricades to the Infirmary. There was an instance when a child in urgent need of medical attention at the Infirmary was turned back. The University's fire engines were stopped at the barricades and not allowed to put out fires that had broken out from the barricades, as well as the burning of the vehicle of Professor Campos. There are other examples, all of which contribute to a finding by the Committee that the barricades, did constitute as a deterrent to the safeguarding of lives and property in the campus during the period of emergency in February. Indeed, it is to be observed with gratification, that such incidents did not lead to more serious outcomes than they actually did and were not as numerous as they might have been.

10. The Committee finds that six taxicabs, a service car of a transportation company, and a motorcycle were commandeered by the students and used in the campus during the period. The commandeering of vehicles began on February 4. The taxi drivers had either been detained or made to alight from their vehicles. The drivers complained that they had been deprived of their means of livelihood during the period they were deprived of their taxicabs. The service car was burned after it had been commandeered. The students also solicited funds at the barricades.

11. It is generally accepted that the security force of the University has been proven inadequate. The Committee, aside from interviews, took note of the study and recommendations made in the report of the Presidential ad hoc Committee on the reorganization of the security division and associates itself with the findings of this study. The

Committee recommends further study for expeditious implementation of the recommendations of the report taking into account the problems and circumstances surrounding the security division in the light of the last crisis, with special reference to the relationship of this security division with the students, the administration and faculty, the campus area residents, and the Quezon City Police Department.

11. The experience of the nine-day strike in the University brought out more sharply into the open the direct effects of the University crisis upon the residents and the entire community of the University as a whole. Community reaction and the need to respond to their problems and to the requirements of their welfare had been previously highlighted by natural disasters, including typhoon Yoling. The main responsibility in extending relief and helping ensure security to the residents affected was indicated, if not expected, and yet the structure and functions of the Office of the President and the UP administration at large has not been established for such community purpose. Its nature and main scope of activity governed by its charter and the University Code primarily concerns itself with advancing the academic goals of the University. The point is made here by the Committee that the reality of the situation brought about by student power and action calls for a new role of the University in connection with its responsibilities to the community as well. The Committee believes that the time has come, in fact it is overdue, for the setting up of an adequate and comprehensive organization that would encompass community safety and welfare on the basis of planned development and self-rule. A recommendation to explore the possibility of a chartered university town is made below.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee submits the following recommendations:

1. Barricades as such should be banned, whether established on national or public roads within the University. The injury and damage they occasion, particularly on the students, themselves, the real danger they pose to lives and property in the University, and the fear and sense of insecurity they cause to the University community - all far outweigh the symbolic purpose for which they were initially established. Additionally, as borne out by the experience of the recent past, the barricade actually results in the deprivation of the rights and freedom of others. Symbolically too, in another sense just as fundamental in the context of an institution of higher learning, the barricade is a barrier to the free flow of knowledge and inquiry. Barricades, then, can be as much, or even more so, a symbol of oppression and a barrier to academic freedom, which by tradition and purpose and by the fundamental law of the land is the firm foundation upon which the University of the Philippines stands.

2. Throughout the days of trouble there was a general consensus on the proposition that the military should not enter the University campus. The Secretary of Justice interpreted an agreement to this effect with the Mayor of Quezon City as one without legal basis. However, it is the Committee's opinion that an agreement such as the one made by the President of the University with the Mayor will have the moral force behind him, especially since the University community generally supports this position. Therefore, it is recommended that an agreement with the Mayor of Quezon City be re-negotiated, with a view to a general recognition of a "state of neutrality" for the University campus at Diliman, to insure its immunity from military intrusions, clearly specifying that police forces should enter only upon request by the President of the University or his duly authorized representative. It is further recommended that such an agreement be affirmed by the Board of Regents and, if possible, confirmed by the highest authority, especially considering the fact that the President of the Republic has made such a commitment to the students in 1969.

3. The intrusion of military forces into the academic community generates fear, provokes violence, or encourages reprisals and antagonisms. Such entry must be condemned as violative of the integrity of the University and obstructive of the very functions of the University. The Constitution of the Philippines provides that, "Universities established by the State shall enjoy academic freedom." It needs to be pointed out that this provision guarantees academic freedom as applied to the individual scholar or scientist, as it does to the University itself, as an institution.

Although it is a creation of the state supported by public funds, its integrity carries, on the one hand, the responsibility and challenge of heritage and a tradition to be nurtured by its constituents, and on the other, the constitutional guarantee from being violated by external forces. The wisdom of this is obvious: the pursuit of knowledge and learning requires certain conditions of independence. The scholar or the scientist must be given the latitude of freedom in gathering and analyzing his material and after this, the same latitude of freedom must be given to him in reaching certain conclusions derived from his experiments or analysis. Such guarantee of freedom also applies to the internal administration of the University and to the management of its services as well as its curricular and research functions.

4. Coercive interruptions of classes should be condemned as anathema to the pursuit of knowledge. The right of protest is as valuable as the right to learn. Indeed, any sort of individual right must carry with it the sanction of being able to defend that right. We wish to add, however, that the right of protest in higher institutions of learning must be carried by its constituencies in a manner consistent with the nature of the University as a citadel of reason. Violent language only tends to obfuscate issues; aggressiveness reduces the settling of differences through reasonable means and opens the gates to the use of force.

5. It is recommended that the University, in addition to banning barricades, prepare and circulate for re-emphasis and guidance to all concerned a policy prohibiting certain types of offenses and reminding all concerned of the consequences of such under existing laws and rules and regulations of the University. Among such offenses are the following committed during the period studied by the Committee. They are: (a) gross discourtesy to the President and other persons in authority; (b) misuse of University property, such as chairs, tables, chemicals, office supplies, etc.; (c) possession and use of deadly weapons, including gasoline bombs, pillbox bombs, and the like; (d) deliberate disturbance of classes and other University functions; (e) defacing of University property with paint, posters, and the like; (f) physical harm to others; (g) forcible entry into and occupancy of University property; and (h) soliciting of funds without appropriate authority. The establishment and maintenance of a climate and system of order, mutual confidence, respect and responsibility, and the recognition and respect of every man's rights, are indispensable in the interest of upholding the integrity and preserving the University as a free institution.

6. The possibility of setting up a special machinery within the Office of the President to provide for similar occurrences in the future, including emergencies that may result from natural catastrophies should be studied and organized as soon as possible. Also, in the interest of community welfare it is recommended that a Community Council of representatives of the various sectors of the University be set up to go into

operation upon occurrence of another emergency in the future.

7. On a long-range basis, serious consideration should be given to the conversion of the University of the Philippines into a chartered university town. Only through such an institution could better security, more efficient internal services, and community development be provided on a stable and continuing basis. It is recommended that such a major project study be undertaken in the near future. A university town or a delineated area, under an integrated programme that could develop a community base for the main functions of the University as an academic institution of higher learning, should serve to provide solutions to some of the basic problems of the University. Furthermore, such a university town will provide the necessary economic, social, and even political ingredients of a municipal corporation on the basis of self-rule and governance. Only when such a university town is established would adequate security force for the internal problems of the University be provided not only for normal, but more especially for periods of emergency. The mode for the selection of leaders, the essential function of governance, as well as the relationship between such leadership and that of the University itself, are some features that will be determined through a concerted study. Surely, the University itself can count on its rich resources and facilities for the development of this project on an interdisciplinary basis. The Institute of Planning has made initial explorations precisely with this objective in view.

8. It is considered opportune for the University of the Philippines to take stock and review in depth its goals in the light of present day circumstances, as well as weigh its role as a specialized public service in terms of contemporary aspirations and demands. It is further submitted that as an institution meant to fulfill basic individual and social rights, the University should now attempt to satisfy these rights more meaningfully. The pursuit of knowledge and truth in the University, which is the activity of the scholar as a free individual, ultimately leads to reexamination of social values and purposes. All forms of knowledge carry with them a social and an ethical responsibility. As all social institutions and established professions are asked by the community to undergo self-study and re-evaluation, so does the University need to perform its bounden duty to reassess and review itself. This should lead to the emergence of a revitalized identity responsive to urgent development requirements of a changing society. Therefore, it is recommended that the entity to make such a study of the University's functions and role must, for the sake of objectivity, be constituted of citizens without discrimination as to social class, religion, political affiliation, and not necessarily limited to U.P. alumni. Such an entity, representative of the various concerns and viewpoints of the nation should be able to indicate what the society at large expects from the University and may chart new directions which the pursuit of learning and truth in the University should take towards relevance.